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Discretion and the transmission lags of monetary 
policy 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 8/2007 
Juha Kilponen – Kai Leitemo 




Monetary policy transmission lags create credibility problems for the inflation-
targeting policy maker who acts under discretion. We show that if prices react to 
monetary policy with a longer lag than output, the welfare maximizing inflation-
targeting policy implies no policy stabilization of cost-push shocks in the 
canonical New Keynesian model. The reason is simple: for the period monetary 
policy influences output, inflation is predetermined and the best discretionary 
policy is to stabilize the output gap fully. We find that money growth targeting 
comes close to replicating the welfare-maximizing policy under commitment if 
there are transmission lags. 
 
Keywords: discretionary and stabilization bias, monetary policy, transmission 
lags, inflation targeting, money targeting 
 
JEL classification numbers: E52, E58, E61  
4 
Optimaalinen rahapolitiikka ja sen välittymisen viiveet 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 8/2007 
Juha Kilponen – Kai Leitemo 




Kun rahapolitiikka vaikuttaa inflaatioon viiveellä, rahapolitiikan uskottavuus-
ongelmat kärjistyvät. Kun keskuspankilla on inflaatiotavoite ja hinnat reagoivat 
kustannussokkeihin hitaammin kuin tuotanto, periodeittain optimoitu raha-
politiikka ei johda inflaatiota stabiloivaan korkoreaktioon. Syynä tähän on se, että 
periodilla, jolla rahapolitiikka voi vaikuttaa tuotantoon, inflaatio on ennalta 
määrätty ja optimaalisella diskreetioon perustuvalla rahapolitiikalla pyritään 
stabiloimaan tuotannon vaihtelut täydellisesti. Tutkimuksessa osoitetaan myös, 
että jos keskuspankin tavoitteena on vakiinnuttaa rahan määrän kasvu, sitä 
seuraavat korkoreaktiot ovat lähellä optimaalisella sitoutumispolitiikalla saatavia 
korkoreaktioita. 
 
Avainsanat: diskreetio ja stabilointiharha, rahapolitiikka, viiveet, Friedmanin 
rahantarjontasääntö, inflaatiotavoite 
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Since Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) we have
known that an overly ambitious monetary policy which aims to bring
output above the natural level is associated with inﬂation and stabilization
biases. If the central bank tries to systematically exploit the short-run
trade oﬀ between output and inﬂation, it will lead to higher inﬂation, and
sub-optimal stabilization of output and inﬂation. Furthermore, due to the
lack of commitment to future policies, discretionary policymaking is unable to
appropriately inﬂuence expectations about the future. At the time policy
is implemented, the advantages of the future commitment may already
have been realized and the policymaker has incentives to deviate from the
pre-announced policy. In the absence of commitment technology, the best
a policymaker can do is to re-optimize policy in every period. Since people
form expectations rationally, this will be anticipated and the only equilibrium
is the time-consistent optimal discretionary equilibrium which may perform
considerably worse than the optimal commitment policy.
This paper studies the impact of delayed eﬀects of monetary policy on
the economy in the discretionary equilibrium. Delayed eﬀects are commonly
referred to as the transmission lags of monetary policy. It is almost universally
accepted that monetary policy is subject to rather long transmission lags and
that they create various challenges for monetary policy. In this paper we
show that if the transmission lags are caused by implementation lags in the
private sector, the credibility problems of a welfare-maximizing policymaker
acting under discretion increase. Under the reasonable assumption that pricing
decisions of ﬁrms are subject to longer implem e n t a t i o nl a g st h a nh o u s e h o l d
consumption decisions, the discretionary policy involves no policy-induced
stabilization of cost-push shocks in the canonical New Keynesian model.1
The argument is simple: at the horizon the policymaker can aﬀect output,
inﬂation is already predetermined. The best discretionary policy is then to fully
stabilize the output gap. The implementation lags have a severe impact on the
discretionary equilibrium, in particular if the cost-push shocks are persistent.
Literature suggests several ways of alleviating discretionary biases
depending on the source of the problem. Söderström (2005) discusses several
delegation schemes that improve on discretionary equilibrium in the New
Keynesian model without implementation lags. In particular, he argues that
there is a role for money growth targeting in reducing the discretionary bias.
We show that the relative beneﬁts of money growth targeting over inﬂation
increase with implementation lags. Our results support the Friedman (1960)
conjecture that lags in the transmission mechanism is a reason for adopting
money growth targeting.
1See Goodfriend and King (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), McCallum and
Nelson (1999) and Clarida et al (1999).
7The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 present the
canonical New Keynesian model and derives the optimal discretionary policy
strategies. Section 3 discusses the evolvement of inﬂation and output under
ﬂexible inﬂation targeting. Welfare comparisons are made in Section 4. Section
5 concludes.
2 The model and monetary policy
The private-sector pricing decisions are carried out within the Calvo (1983)
framework. In each period the ﬁrm has a ﬁxed probability of changing its
price. The ﬁrm sets prices in order to maximize proﬁts under the condition
that it might not be able to adjust prices in the next period. In addition, we
assume that there is a j-period implementation lag of prices,2 ie prices are set
in advance of the actual implementation. This leads to the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (see Roberts, 1995 and Woodford, 2003) given by
πt+j = δπt+j+1|t + γxt+j|t + εt+j, (2.1)
where πt ≡ pt − pt−1 is inﬂation, xt is the output gap, δ is the representative
agent’s discount factor and εt+1 is a cost-push shock that represents other
f a c t o r st h a ti n ﬂuence price setting at time t+j, not considered at time t.3 These
factors can be surprise movements in the mark-up of prices. The consumption
Euler equation gives rise to an expectational IS-curve of the form (see, eg,
Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997, McCallum and Nelson, 1999 and Woodford,
2003)
xt+m = xt+m+1|t − σ
¡





in case where there is an m-period implementation lag in consumption
decisions. The model has been extensively studied by Woodford (2003) and
Clarida et al (1999), and by Svensson and Woodford (2005) in the case of
j = m =1period implementation lags. Furthermore, Woodford (2003, chapter
8) studies the case with j = m = d,w h e r ed is any arbitrary, positive number.4
In this paper, we assume that j > m, ie that the implementation lag of prices
may be either longer or equal to that of output. Based on evidence from VAR
models (eg, Christiano et al, 2005) and other empirical models (eg, Rudebusch,
2002a,b), it is in fact reasonable to assume that inﬂation and output responds
to changes in monetary policy with diﬀerent delays. Such diﬀerences in delays
are also featured in several theoretical models of the monetary transmission
mechanism (see, eg, Svensson, 1997). The traditional forward-looking New
Keynesian Phillips curve without implementation lags suggests that inﬂation
2This could be due staggering of wage/and or price contracts or because of information
delays.
3We follow Svensson and Woodford (2005) in assuming that the cost-push shock have
an immediate inﬂuence on pricing. Note that this assumption is not important for the
conclusions regarding the credibility problems of monetary policy in this paper.
4For any variable z,w eu s et h en o t a t i o nt h a tzt+d|t ≡ Etzt+d, where Et is mathematical
expectation operator.
8responds simultaneously with changes in output. Considering the empirical
evidence, such a feature seems unrealistic and any policy advice hinging on
this could be problematic. By allowing for implementation lags, however, the
NK model can generate plausible impulse responses where output precedes
inﬂation movements, see, eg Woodford (2003, section 3.12).
2.1 Monetary policy under ﬂexible inﬂation targeting
We study ﬁrst the monetary policy regime where the central bank maximizes












Woodford (2003) shows that the period loss in (2.4) represents a quadratic
approximation to (the negative of) consumer welfare given that λ = ψ
−1γ is
a function of the elasticity of substitution between alternative diﬀerentiated
goods (ψ) and elasticity of inﬂation with respect to output gap (γ).
Thus minimizing the expected loss (2.3) produces the welfare maximizing
equilibrium up to a quadratic approximation.5 Svensson (1997) denotes this
monetary policy as ﬂexible inﬂation targeting.
Given the model in (2.1) and (2.2), the policy problem under discretion can

















xt+m − xt+m+1|t + σ
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m2λxt+m|t + γμt+m − υt+m
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5The welfare-theoretic loss function applies to the model with implementation lags, see
Woodford (2003, ch. 8, p. 570).
9The ﬁrst-order conditions (2.6)—(2.9) imply that for every period t ≥ t0,
xt+m|t =0 , for j>m ,and
xt+m|t = −
γ
λπt+m|t, for j = m. (2.10)
Equations (2.1) and (2.10) determine the path for inﬂation and (expected)
output. The policy rule for the (expected) interest rate can be derived using
equations (2.2) and (2.10):
it+m|t = πt+m|t + rn










t+m|t, for j = m. (2.11)
The equations in (2.11) determine the optimal policy ‘announcements’ m
period in advance of policy implementation. As noted by Svensson and
Woodford (2005), however, the unforecastable component of the interest
rate (it+m − it+m|t) inﬂuence neither of the targeting variables. Nor has
the policymaker any incentives to deviate from the announcement and to
produce surprises. Correspondingly, we assume that the policymaker sets the
unforecastable part of interest rate to zero. The policymaker implements the
interest rate policy therefore by setting it+m = it+m|t.
The optimality conditions in (2.10) show that the optimal monetary
policy in the discretionary equilibrium depends on the relative length of the
implementation lags. When inﬂation is predetermined for a longer time that
output, the interest rate is set with the intention of keeping output equal
to its natural rate. The reason for this is that at the time policy is being
announced, inﬂation is predetermined, and the central bank has no incentives
to pay attention to inﬂation determination within the period. The policymaker
does not trade-oﬀ any output variability with inﬂation variability and there are
no stabilization of cost-push shocks. In the case with implementation lags of
equal length, however, the central bank inﬂuences output and inﬂation in the
same period. Thus the monetary authority trades oﬀ inﬂation expectations
with output gap expectations without having to commit to future policies.
The credibility problem of monetary policy can be alleviated by delegating
monetary policy to a central bank with a modiﬁed loss function. Svensson and
Woodford (2005) show that if the implementation lags of inﬂation and output
both are equal to one, including the revision of the (one period ahead) inﬂation
forecast in the social loss function with a weight corresponding to the loss
caused by a marginal increase in the inﬂation forecasts (in optimum), produces
a solution that replicates the timeless commitment solution. Although we
do not argue against the possibility that there may be a modiﬁed extension
to the loss function that can reduce the discretionary bias in the case of
diﬀering implementation lags too, the extension would however be highly
model dependent. Furthermore, as Svensson and Woodford (2005) also note,
such a solution to the discretionary problem involves ‘a somewhat abstract
consideration for the purposes of practical policymaking’. Since we view
implementability of the solution as essential, we do not explore this venue
any further and restrict the analysis by only considering regimes that seem
realistic alternatives to inﬂation targeting.
The beneﬁts of price-level targeting versus inﬂation targeting have been
discussed by Vestin (2006). He shows that price-level targeting under discretion
10can produce an outcome that replicates inﬂation targeting under commitment.
Price level targeting in many respects represents an improvement over inﬂation
targeting, not only because it can reduce the credibility problem of the central
bank, but also because it is an easily implementable and practical alternative
to inﬂation targeting. It does not, however, alleviate the credibility problems
caused by implementation lags for the same reason as above: prices are
predetermined at the horizon the policymaker can aﬀect output.
2.2 Monetary policy under money growth targeting
Given that price-level targeting does not alleviate the credibility problem
associated with implementation lags, the closest alternative to the
welfare-maximizing inﬂation targeting policy is arguably money growth
targeting. Interestingly, money growth targeting was originally promoted
by Friedman (1960) partly due to the perceived problems associated with
transmission lags and discretionary policy of trying to control prices directly.
Friedman warned against trying to stabilize inﬂation directly in a discretionary
manner due to long and variable lags in the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy.
[...] the link between price changes and monetary changes over
short periods is too loose and too imperfectly known to make price
level stability an objective and reasonably unambiguous guide to
policy. [...] [T]here is much evidence that monetary changes have
their eﬀect only after a considerable lag and over a long period and
that the lag is rather variable. (p. 87)
He instead promoted the well-known k − % money growth rule:
[...] The stock of money [should be] increased at a ﬁxed rate
year-in and year-out without any variation in the rate of increase
to meet cyclical needs. (p. 90)
Friedman argued that discretionary policymaking aiming to stabilize inﬂation
could potentially be destabilizing due to imperfect knowledge about the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy, including the lag structure.
Although imperfect knowledge is not the reason why transmission lags of
monetary policy creates credibility problems analysed in this paper, the
money growth targeting strategy does oﬀer some robustness to diﬀerent lag
speciﬁcations since it is independent of the lag structure of the economy.6
Furthermore, and relevant for our current perspective, money growth targeting
(or the ‘Friedman k − % rule’) does not involve the potential temptation to
deviate from the announced policy as is the case under inﬂation targeting.
6In Kilponen and Leitemo (2007) we discuss the advantages of money growth targeting
in providing robustness against model uncertainty when there are implementation lags in
price setting.
11Söderström (2005) discusses some of the beneﬁts of money growth targeting
in the New Keynesian framework as a solution to the credibility problem. For
these reasons, we investigate how the solution to the credibility problem oﬀered
by money growth targeting changes as a result of implementation lags.
The interest rate implication of money growth targeting can be derived in




We assume that the demand for money is given by a conventional money
demand function7
mt − pt = xt − κit + vt. (2.13)
By subtracting real money balances ˆ mt−1 ≡ mt−1 − pt−1 on both sides, the
growth rate of money supply is given by
∆mt = πt + ∆xt − κit − ˆ mt−1 + vt. (2.14)
In the intertemporal minimization of equation (2.12), the central bank chooses




[πt + ∆xt − ˆ mt−1 + vt]. (2.15)
Although the strategy of money growth targeting stated in terms of interest
rate is model dependent, we note that it is independent of the length of the
transmission lags in the model under conventional assumptions about money
demand, ie, it is robust to diﬀerent assumptions about implementation lags.
3 Equilibrium responses under inﬂation targeting
In this section we study the eﬀe c to ft r a n s m i s s i o nl a g so ni n ﬂation and
output and how the cost-push shock inﬂuences these variables in the optimal
discretionary equilibrium. We focus on the case where inﬂation reacts to
changes in monetary policy with a greater lag than output, and contrasts
this case where j =1and m =0with the case of no implementation lags.
For the case with implementation lags, the solution for the output gap is
given from equation (2.10) as xt =0 . The ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation for
inﬂation can then be found by using (2.10) in equation (2.1). This results in











εt for j =0 .( 3 . 2 )
Under the assumption that the cost-push shock follows the AR(1) process,
εt+1 = ρεεt +ˆ εt+1, (3.3)
7See for instance Walsh (2003), ch 2 for the derivation of money demand equation in the
context of dynamic money-in-the-utility function model.
12the forward solution for inﬂa t i o nc a nb ef o u n db yn o t i n gt h a tπt+1 = πt+1|t +
εt+1 − εt+1|t and solving forward for πt+1|t. This yields









where ˆ εt+1 ≡ εt+1 − εt+1|t.
In the the standard case where j = m =0 , the solution for output is found
from equations (2.1), (2.10) and (3.3) and it is given by
xt = −
γ
γ2 + λ(1 − δρε)
εt. (3.5)
The forward solution for inﬂation is found by combining equations (2.1) and

















































γ2 (1 − δρε)
!
εt+1, (3.7)
The equilibrium behaviour of the models with and without the implementation
lag diﬀers in two important respects. The ﬁrst diﬀerence is related to the
expectations channel. In the model with the implementation lag, the only
immediate eﬀect is a one-to-one reaction of inﬂation to the surprise component
of the cost-push shock ˆ εt+1,r e f .t h eﬁr s tt e r mi ne q u a t i o n( 3 . 4 ) .T h u s ,i n ﬂation
does not respond immediately to the expected future eﬀect of the surprise as
it does in the model without implementation lags (see equation (3.6)). In the
model with implementation lags, the remaining eﬀect is delayed by one period,
ref. the second term in (3.4). However, only a part ρ
ε of the surprise shock
survives until the second period and then aﬀects the inﬂation path through
the expectations channel as ﬁrms reoptimize prices given new information
about the future path of marginal costs. This delayed eﬀect reduces inﬂation
variability in the model with implementation lag. The reduction is particularly
large when the cost-push shocks has little persistence, ie ρε is small. The
expectation channel is then relatively unimportant for inﬂation determination.
The second type of diﬀerence regards optimal policy under the two models.
As noted above, the monetary policymaker does not respond by adjusting
13output in the case with the implementation lag and hence inﬂation is not
insulated from the cost-push shock. In the absence of implementation lag, the
monetary policymaker is able to trade-oﬀ some of the inﬂation variability with
output variability in response to the cost-push shock.
The monetary policy channel has a stronger impact on inﬂation if the
persistence of the cost-push shock (ρε) is large. If cost-push shocks are
persistent and monetary policymaker does not stabilize the cost-push shock,
the price setters expect marginal costs to be high for a long time and they
increase todays prices at a faster rate. Hence, current inﬂation reacts strongly
to the cost-push shock.
The eﬀects on inﬂation are summarized by equation (3.7). It shows that
inﬂation is a function of four terms in the model without implementation
lags. The ﬁrst two terms correspond to inﬂa t i o ni nt h em o d e lw i t ht h e
implementation lag. The third term represents the additional eﬀect on inﬂation
through the expectation channel and the fourth term represents the eﬀect of
a policy that insulates inﬂation from the cost-push shock.
4 Welfare and the discretionary bias
In this section we study the eﬀects on social loss of implementation lags in
pricing decisions and compare it to the standard model with no implementation
lag.
We let the disturbances to the output and money demand equations follow








vt+1 = ρvvt +ˆ vt+1. (4.2)
As noted above, εt is a cost-push shock, rn
t is a shock to the natural rate of
interest and vt is a money demand shock. We calibrate the model according
to Giannoni and Woodford (2005) by setting β =0 .99, γ =0 .024, σ =6 ,
ρr =0 .35,a n dσˆ r =0 .0372. Since Giannoni and Woodford (2005) do not
produce calibrated values for the parameters in the cost-push shock process,
we set σε =0 .01 and ρε =0 .5. We also consider higher degree of persistence in
the cost push shock below. For the parameters in the money demand equation
(2.13), we have used the estimates from Kilponen and Leitemo (2007). Using
the US data8 over the period 1980q1 − 2004q4,w eo b t a i n e da ne s t i m a t eo f
κ =0 .43 with a coeﬃcient standard error of 0.11.9 Moreover, the estimated
parameter values of the disturbance processes are ρv =0 .77 and σˆ v =0 .0116.
8The estimation was carried out with ordinary least square allowing for serial correlation
of the residual of order one. We used HP-ﬁltered data on log monetary base, log GDP
deﬂator, log GDP and the federal funds rate. The detrending was carried out with a
smoothing parameter of 1600 over the period 1960q1—2005q4 to reduce the endpoint problem
associated with the ﬁlter.
9Varying the endpoint of the estimation period between 1990q1 and 2005q4, produced
estimates between 0.35 and 0.45, well within the range suggested by the standard error of
the estimate for the shorter period. The estimate also stabilized very close to our point
estimate after year 2000.
14Finally, the elasticity of substitution between alternative diﬀerentiated goods
(ψ) in is parameterized as ψ
−1 =0 .13 as in Woodford (2003). This implies
that inﬂation is the component of the welfare loss that dominates, and social
loss can be studied primarily by the impact on inﬂation.
Given the parameterization, we compute the welfare loss under the
discretionary and commitment equilibria. Furthermore, we illustrate the
importance of the persistence of cost push shocks by analyzing the two models
with two alternative assumptions on the persistence of cost push shock. Results
as regards welfare loss10 is presented in Table 1. Figures 1—4 in appendix show
the equilibrium responses of the model under diﬀerent policies and assumptions
about the persistence of cost-push shocks.
Table 1: Comparison of welfare losses under diﬀerent models and policies




Money growth targeting 0.216 0.122
(+52%) (+12%)
As observed from Table 1, there are substantial beneﬁts in having access
to commitment technology if the central bank is maximizing welfare directly
through inﬂation targeting. The welfare loss is 73 per cent higher with
discretion in the standard model. The gains from committing are slightly
lower under the model with the implementation lag. Discretion produces a
loss that is 52 per cent higher than under commitment. Commitment is more
important in the setting without implementation lag since the expectations
channel has a stronger inﬂuence on the outcome, as discussed in Section 3.
The central bank can improve signiﬁcantly on the outcome with money
growth targeting. This is in particular evident in the model with the
implementation lag, where loss is only 12 per cent above the optimal
commitment equilibrium as opposed to 52 per cent in the model without lags.
The model supports the claim by Friedman that money growth targeting is
welfare improving in particular if there are transmission lags in monetary
policy, but for a diﬀerent reason: Money growth targeting alleviates the
problem caused by a lack of credibility with discretionary inﬂation-targeting
policy.
As noted in the previous section, the persistence of the cost-push shock
inﬂuences whether or not lags in the model improve on the relative performance
of the discretionary policy. With the baseline assumption of ρε =0 .5,al a gw i l l
in fact improve on the relative performance of discretion. This is a result of
ﬁrms not accounting for the future eﬀect of the shock in the period in which the
shock occurs which has a moderating eﬀect on inﬂation. This eﬀect outweighs
the eﬀect of a missing monetary policy channel on inﬂation under the baseline
calibration.
10Welfare losses in the table are scaled up by a factor 103.
15However, this result is overturned if the cost-push shock becomes
suﬃciently persistent. In Table 2, we consider the case where ρ  =0 .7.
This higher degree of persistence suggests a half-life of inﬂation of about 2
quarters, which does not seem unreasonably high considering the high degree
o fp e r s i s t e n c ei no b s e r v e di n ﬂation. The presence of an implementation
lag now worsens the discretionary equilibrium substantially. Discretion
produces welfare losses that is 123 per cent and 258 per cent higher than
under commitment in the model with and without the implementation lag
respectively. Since the shock is expected to have a more persistent eﬀect
on costs, the control of expectations channel via the appropriate design of
monetary policy is vital to the outcome. Such a control is not available to the
policymaker in the discretionary equilibrium.
Table 2: Comparison of welfare losses under diﬀerent models and policies.




Money growth targeting 0.382 0.216
(+77%) (+39%)
The table considers the case with ρε =0 .7 and the
standard deviation of the cost-push shock (σε) unchanged at 0.01.
Although the performance of money growth targeting deteriorates relative
to the optimal commitment policy with increased cost-push persistence, it
improves relative to the discretionary inﬂation targeting equilibrium. With
increased persistence and the implementation lag, money growth targeting
reduces the loss (relative to inﬂation targeting under discretion) by 61 per
cent compared to 28 per cent in the case with baseline persistence. The
corresponding numbers are 21 per cent and 12 per cent in the model without
the implementation lag.
The beneﬁts of money growth targeting is due to its ability to induce history
dependence in policymaking. As can be seens from the implied interest rate
rule in (2.15), money growth targeting features history dependence through
the terms ∆xt and ˆ mt−1.11 Such a history dependent policy aﬀects people’s
expectations about the future. This can improve the equilibrium substantially
in a model where these expectations play a major role. Figures 1—4 in the
appendix show the impulse responses of the model to a cost-push shock. The
response under money growth targeting bears relatively close resemblance to
that of the optimal commitment policy. It produces hump-shaped output
and inﬂation responses that reﬂect the history-dependence of the policy under
both the commitment and money growth rule. Why does history dependence
contribute to an improved outcome? Under both money growth targeting
and the commitment equilibrium, the price level is (trend) stationary. Under
11This is extensively discussed in Söderström (2005).
16money growth targeting prices will over time return to the money growth path.
A cost-push shock that raises inﬂation today will lead to people expecting
future inﬂation to be relatively low as to get prices in line with money.
Expectations of lower inﬂation tomorrow has a moderating eﬀect on inﬂation
today, since inﬂation is a function of expected future inﬂation.
Money growth targeting does not exactly replicate the commitment
solution, however, and is furthermore ineﬃciently aﬀected by money demand
shocks that induce variability in the interest rate. The variability in the interest
rate induces ineﬃcient movements in output which again aﬀects inﬂation. In
the case with implementation lags on prices, however, the initial shock to
money demand has no impact on inﬂation since prices are predetermined. This
reduces the ineﬃcient impact of the money demand shock since only a part
of the money demand shock survives into the future and can aﬀect inﬂation.
This is the reason why the eﬃciency of money growth targeting increases with
the implementation lag.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
It is well established that monetary policy is subject to transmission lags.
These lags can be the results of delayed responses of the private sector to
economic shocks. We show under the reasonable assumption that if inﬂation
reacts with a longer lag than output to changes in monetary policy, the optimal
discretionary equilibrium implies no policy-induced stabilization of cost-push
shocks. Since inﬂation is predetermined at the time when monetary policy
can inﬂuence output, the discretionary optimizing policymaker stabilize the
output gap perfectly and does not stabilize inﬂation.
Implementation lags in prices increase the discretionary stabilization bias
severely if cost-push shocks are suﬃciently persistent. Money growth targeting
reduces the bias substantially, since it features history dependence, similarly
to the policy under commitment equilibrium. Although we admit that money
growth targeting is currently out of fashion, it provides a practical and
implementable solution to the credibility problems of monetary policy when
there are implementation lags and commitment technology is not available.
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Equilibrium responses to cost-push shocks
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Figure 1: Equilibrium responses to cost-push shock in the standard New
Keynesian model.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium responses to persistent cost-push shocks in the standard
New Keynesian model under alternative policies.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium responses to cost-push shocks in the model with
one period implementation lag under alternative policies. Standard
parameterisation of the model.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium responses to persistent cost-push shocks in the model
with one period implementation lag under alternative policies.
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